The Gaitanistas, also known as the Gulf Clan, Urabeños, and Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), emerged from the ashes of Colombia’s paramilitary movement to become the dominant criminal force in Colombia, with national reach.
The Gaitanistas are primarily involved in transnational drug trafficking. The group controls territories where it regulates or directs the coca paste production market and guards shipments along trafficking routes. Once the coca paste has reached cocaine processing laboratories, the AGC can also store the final product before shipping it to coastal and border regions.
History
The Gaitanistas, or Urabeños, take their name from Urabá, a northwestern region of Colombia near the Panamanian border highly prized by drug traffickers. Urabá offers access to the Caribbean and Pacific coasts from the departments of Antioquia and Chocó.
The AGC’s origins can be traced to notorious paramilitary warlord Vicente Castaño, who broke away from the demobilization process of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) in 2006. He then rearmed a paramilitary unit with two of his lieutenants: the former commander of the AUC’s Calima Bloc, Ever Veloza Garcia, alias “HH,” and Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias “Don Mario,” the former finance chief of one of the wealthiest paramilitary factions, the Centauros Bloc.
When Castaño was killed in March 2007, Don Mario inherited the network, and set to work recruiting former paramilitary fighters in Urabá. Don Mario quickly assembled a fighting force of around 80 men and then monopolized this important drug route, taxing traffickers for every kilogram of cocaine that passed through his territory. By 2008, Don Mario was one of the richest and most-wanted traffickers in Colombia. He began to expand his empire, moving into southern Córdoba province, the Bajo Cauca region in northern Antioquia, and into Medellín.
Don Mario was captured on a farm in rural Urabá in April 2009. Following his capture, the AGC fell under the control of Juan de Dios Úsuga, alias “Giovanni,” and Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” two brothers who had begun their underworld careers with the now demobilized guerrillas of the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) before passing into the ranks of the AUC.
The Úsuga brothers gathered other former EPL guerrillas turned paramilitaries, who formed the disciplined and capable military core of the AGC, the “Estado Mayor,” or board of directors. They launched a new expansion plan by sending trusted lieutenants from Urabá to take control of strategic drug trafficking real estate, preferably through alliances and agreements, but otherwise through violence.
In January 2012, Giovanni, the mastermind of the AGC strategy, was killed during a police raid on a ranch in the department of Chocó, leaving Otoniel as the maximum leader. Despite this setback, the AGC expansion continued.
The AGC’s influence spread across much of the country, and soon the group controlled drug production zones, trafficking corridors, and international dispatch points throughout north Colombia, along both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and along the land border with Venezuela.
To facilitate this expansion, the Gaitanistas also developed a new model of organized crime: franchising. While some of it directly controlled some cells, the group also absorbed local criminal organizations into its network, which operated as semi-autonomous members of the AGC “franchise.”
In 2015, the government launched a major offensive against the AGC known as “Operation Agamemnon.” The first phase of the operation had no significant results, but the second phase of the operation, which began in 2017, managed to impact the AGC’s command nodes. In May, security forces killed Otoniel’s second-in-command, Roberto Vargas Gutiérrez, alias “Gavilán,” and then in November, they killed military boss Luis Orlando Padierma, alias “Inglaterra.”
With pressure mounting, and following two years of tentative approaches, Otoniel offered to turn himself in and demobilize the AGC in September 2017, even appearing in a public video appealing to the Colombian government. That offer was refused and Agamemnon continued to weaken Otoniel’s control, who saw his closest advisors captured and killed, and his family targeted.
After years of being on the run, Otoniel was captured in October 2021. In May 2022, he was extradited to the United States and charged in New York for conspiring to manufacture cocaine and distribute it to the US. He was found guilty and sentenced to 45 years in prison.
After Otoniel’s capture, Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” took over leadership of the AGC.In late 2022, the AGC indicated their willingness to participate in the Total Peace (Paz Total) plan put forward by Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro which seeks to negotiate peace with all armed groups in the country. However, the negotiation process with the AGC has made little progress due to the lack of a judicial framework which would apply to the group, as well as members’ unwillingness to turn themselves in as a potential outcome of the negotiations.
Leadership and Structure
The current leader of the AGC is Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo.” He was born in Urabá, the region which is also the birthplace of the AGC, and holds the organization in firm hands after the arrest of Otoniel. Chiquito Malo was a paramilitary fighter with the AUC until it demobilized in 2004. Afterward, he was the commander of the AGC’s Central Urabá Structure, which occupies territory that is key for drug trafficking to Central America and the United States.
Below Chiquito Malo, other key players form the organization’s so-called board of directors. José Gonzalo Sánchez, alias “Gonzalito,” is the second-in-command, followed by Orosman Ostén Blanco, alias “Rodrigo Flechas,” alias “Julián,” and alias “Joaquín.”
The central leadership has seen some internal friction following Otoniel’s capture. In March 2023, Wilmer Antonio Giraldo Quiroz, alias “Siopas,” was killed. Siopas was one of Otoniel’s most trusted men before he was captured, and there are indications that Siopas was planning to create a dissident AGC group alongside other high-ranking members to avoid a potential commitment to laying down their arms as part of the Total Peace negotiations.
The AGC established a mixed network model, in which approximately one-third of local cells were directly commanded by the leadership in Urabá, while the others were local criminal organizations that used the AGC name and were expected to provide services or follow strategic orders when called upon.
The AGC’s model is based on local cells that are financially self-sufficient. As such, some cells have moved into criminal economies outside of drug trafficking, such as illegal mining, extortion, migrant smuggling, and microtrafficking. Groups may also direct or tax other criminal activities within their territory.
Geography
The AGC franchise has a presence in at least 20 of Colombia’s departments, as well as internationally. The group’s base and territorial stronghold is centered around the Gulf of Urabá in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, and stretching into Córdoba. They have an extensive presence throughout the rest of these departments, as well as along the Caribbean coast, in the city of Medellín, and in departments such as La Guajira, Santander, Valle del Cauca, and Norte de Santander.
The group has also fought for control of criminal economies on the border between Colombia and Venezuela. However, given the strength of rival groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the ex-FARC mafia, the AGC has been unable to establish much territorial control. Its presence in the area is limited to areas around Puerto Santander and Cúcuta, while it has no presence in Venezuela. A series of arrests in Panama suggest that the AGC may have subcontracted operations to a local gang, which would receive and store large quantities of drugs smuggled from Colombia. This highlights the group’s ability to expand its franchise model and the control it has over drug trafficking and migrant smuggling on the border between Colombia and Panama.
Allies and Enemies
The competition for territory sparked by the demobilization of the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) has pitted the AGC against the ELN. The groups have clashed in Chocó, Antioquia, Bolívar, and Norte de Santander, as well as other occasional conflicts in other departments.
In 2020 and 2021, it was reported that the group had made an alliance with its old enemies, the Rastrojos, to fight back against both the ELN and the ex-FARC Mafia in Norte de Santander. Meanwhile, in northern and northeastern Antioquia, the organization has also contested key drug trafficking and illegal mining territory with the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) of the ex-FARC mafia. Since 2020, the AGC has confronted the Pachenca, also known as the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra (Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra). The two groups are seeking to control drug trafficking routes in the Sierra Nevada near the Caribbean port city of Santa Marta.
The AGC’s drug trafficking operations have also seen the group build alliances with independent drug traffickers within Colombia and Mexican drug trafficking groups like the Sinaloa Cartel. The organization’s leadership has also maintained a relationship with the ‘Ndrangheta, an Italian mafia, since the days of the AUC. It works with other European drug trafficking networks, including Balkan criminal groups.
Prospects
Otoniel’s capture led many analysts to speculate that the gang would enter a decline. However, this has not been the case, and the AGC has remained one of Colombia’s strongest criminal groups.
After Gustavo Petro assumed the Colombian presidency in August 2022, the group expressed its willingness to participate in his Total Peace plan. However, the negotiation process with the AGC has made little progress due to the lack of a judicial framework which would apply to the group, as well as members’ unwillingness to turn themselves in as a potential outcome of the negotiations.
So far, the AGC appears to be acting strategically. While it is still defining its role in Petro’s Total Peace, the group has also expanded its territorial control into areas where other groups such as the ELN and EMC are present. These groups’ active dialogues with the government have limited their ability to carry out armed offensives, occasionally giving the AGC an edge.