Violence against civilians in Colombia is rising amid the various crises facing the government’s Total Peace policy and the strengthening of armed and criminal groups. 

Between January and May 2024, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded a 36% increase in the number of people being displaced compared to the same period in 2023. There was also a 171% increase in people experiencing confinement and a 13.8% increase affected by conflict. So far, 53,600 people have been affected by confinement and 29,200 people by mass displacement.

“Since January 2024, there has been a significant increase in the number of confinements. In all months of the first quarter, there has been an increase in events compared to the same period last year. March stands out in particular, with almost four times as many events,” OCHA told InSight Crime in an email.

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Colombia’s security situation has been aggravated by several factors, including the criminal actions of armed groups and difficulties in negotiations between the state and armed groups under Total Peace, the flagship policy put forward by President Gustavo Petro in which the government negotiates with different armed groups and criminal gangs in parallel.

Below, InSight Crime analyzes why violence is rising in Colombia.

Criminal Disputes Fuel Violence

The Pacific region, comprising the departments of Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño, has been the most affected by violence in 2024, with criminal disputes increasing the number of people affected. 

In Chocó, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia –  AGC), also known as the Gaitanistas, have for years been engaged in all-out war over drug trafficking and illegal mining.

In Cauca and Nariño, the ELN and dissidents of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), also known as the ex-FARC mafia, are fighting for control of areas crucial to different parts of the drug trafficking chain, from coca cultivation and cocaine processing to maritime drug departure ports. 

In Putumayo and Caqueta, the humanitarian crisis stems from clashes between the Carolina Ramírez Front of the ex-FARC mafia’s Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Border Command, a group allied to another faction of FARC dissidents called the Second Marquetalia. The departments are among the country’s coca-growing hotspots and are key departure points for drug shipments leaving for Ecuador and Brazil via the Putumayo River. 

“In recent months, these dynamics [of violence] have resulted in large-scale confinements, with more than 17,000 people affected in the municipalities of Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Guzmán, Puerto Leguízamo, Villagarzón in Putumayo, and Solano in Caquetá, areas where these kinds of emergencies had not occurred in years,” the OCHA commented.

Other areas, including southern Bolívar, also saw rising levels of violence. Since 2023, the Ombudsman’s Office has warned of increased clashes between FARC, ELN, and AGC dissident groups for control of the area, which is another key corridor for drug trafficking and illegal mining. 

Peace Negotiations Stall

The increase in humanitarian incidents in Colombia comes as Petro’s government is seeking peace deals with some of the country’s largest armed groups: the ELN and factions associated with the EMC. But negotiations with both groups are currently on hold.

Dialogue with the ELN stalled in February after the government announced the initiation of regional talks with the Comuneros del Sur Front in Nariño, a group that declared a rebellion against the Central Command (Comando Central – COCE), the ELN’s main leadership body. The ELN’s emissaries argued that only delegates at the national level should be authorized to negotiate with the government and subsequently suspended their part in negotiations. 

Additionally, in May, the ELN announced the reactivation of extortion kidnappings as a form of financing, causing tensions. Although both parties signed an agreement on the participation of civil society in the talks, the ELN claims that the talks remain frozen.

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Talks with the EMC fragmented in March, when Petro suspended the ceasefire in the departments of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, which together account for 30% of the humanitarian incidents recorded by OCHA between January and May. This break in the ceasefire came after factions associated with the EMC killed an Indigenous leader in Cauca. Tensions within the EMC over whether to continue negotiating with the government led fronts loyal to Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” to leave the table, while others decided to continue. 

The crises in the negotiations have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the government’s Total Peace policy in reducing the rates of violence in the territories where these groups are present.

“Between January and April 2024, continued clashes between Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) and the suspension of the bilateral ceasefire between the government and one of these groups resulted in an increase in people affected by confinement and massive forced displacement, especially in the departments of Cauca, Putumayo, Caquetá, and in Magdalena Medio, mainly Sur de Bolívar,” OCHA told InSight Crime.

Ceasefires with the ELN and the EMC have only reduced violence against security forces, while clashes between illegal groups continue, affecting citizens. 

“The ceasefire is with the armed forces, but not with the community,” Alejandra López, a humanitarian analyst told InSight Crime. 

More Violence, Greater Social Control

As violence and conflict have increased, armed and criminal groups have deepened their social control. 

One of the main forms that this control has taken is “carnetización” — the issuing of IDs to inhabitants in territories where the groups have a presence — to control the entry and exit of people. During the year, the Ombudsman’s Office and other institutions announced an increase in the number of people being given IDs by FARC dissidents in the departments of Meta, Nariño, Antioquia, Cauca, Tolima, and Huila, among others. 

In addition, the groups have increased mobility restrictions in departments such as Caquetá, Cauca, Córdoba, Chocó, Meta, Antioquia, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Santander, Guaviare, Arauca, and Putumayo.

Restrictions on mobility and/or access are part of the strategy to control NSAGs, including the control of businesses, restrictions on movement, limitations on access to cultivation areas, and in some cases, the carnetización of people,” OCHA said. 

As with enforced IDs and restrictions on movement, confinement is aimed at controlling the entry and exit of people, goods, and services into and out of a territory. This gives the groups enforcing confinement greater territorial control and allows them to mobilize troops and illegal resources without major impediments. An example of this are the armed strikes that the ELN launched against the Gaitanistas in Chocó in February, which affected approximately 24,000 people.

In other cases, confinements occur because victims of violence prefer not to move, said Manuela Barrero, a researcher who has studied the topic extensively.

“If they are displaced to the nearest municipal capital, there is no effective response from the state to relocate them or to guarantee their humanitarian needs,” he said, adding that displacement can also generate more pressure from the armed groups, who seek to prevent the humanitarian impact of their activities from becoming visible.

Feature image: The EMC mount an illegal roadblock in Corinto, Cauca, in April 2024. Credit: Associated Press.