Changes in the leadership of Colombia’s illicit crop substitution program and problems in its implementation raise questions about how organized crime is hindering the government initiative.

Colombia’s Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos) was born out of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). The program’s goal is to reduce the amount of coca crops in the country through substitution, depriving criminal groups of the raw material needed for cocaine production. 

However, the project’s implementation has faced major obstacles. Colombia continues to have the largest number of hectares of coca in the world and has recently broken records in cocaine production.

In mid-May, President Gustavo Petro named Gloria Miranda as the new national director of the Directorate for the Substitution of Illicit Crops, the entity in charge of implementing the program. Until then, Miranda had served as Director of Drug Policy and Related Activities in the Ministry of Justice.  

Miranda’s new appointment is in response to criticism that the government has done little to implement the substitution program. During a Congressional debate in April, representatives announced that only 5% of the budget allocated to the program was used during 2023. 

SEE ALSO: Peace Leaders in Putumayo, Colombia Bet Their Lives on Coca Crop Substitution

As a result of its failure to implement the program, the government’s relationship with communities in coca-growing areas has deteriorated. Coca growers in departments such as Norte de Santander and Córdoba announced that they will go on strike due to the government’s failure to uphold the substitution program. Families who signed substitution agreements continue to demand answers.

Below, InSight Crime explains key points from the current debate on coca cultivation in Colombia, how organized crime has hindered the implementation of the substitution program, and the role armed groups may play in the future of the initiative.

A Road Full of Obstacles

When the substitution program was created in 2017, experts considered it Colombia’s most ambitious coca crop substitution strategy yet. It was organized around agreements between families and the national government: families would eradicate their crops, and, in return, the government would provide subsidies and technical advice for short- and long-term agricultural projects. 

“It was an overly ambitious program with huge goals,” Luis Felipe Cruz, a researcher at DeJusticia, a legal and social research center, explained to InSight Crime.

From the beginning, the substitution program was plagued with problems, starting with the lack of coordination between its management and the Ministry of Agriculture and other government institutions. The program was also hindered by its lack of budget and program design that failed to consider the different needs of different territories, according to a report by the Center for Studies on Security and Drugs of the Universidad de los Andes. 

Criminal groups in coca-growing areas pointed to the shortcomings of the substitution program to legitimize their claims about the government’s failure to comply with the peace accords, and to increase distrust of the government among affected communities. 

The failure to implement the substitution program also put social leaders who supported it in their territories at risk. After the government and families signed the agreements, the murder rate of social leaders increased by 546%, according to a study by economist Lucas Marín Llanes.

The national government’s drug policy outlines its strategy to implement the program, which consists of making payments of 36 million pesos — about $9,000 — to the families that joined. But the governments’ commitments to productive projects established at the outset of the program remain undefined.

The complex social and economic reality in coca-growing areas means these measures will not be enough to solve the violence that plagues local communities, where criminal groups have strengthened in the last year.

A Missed Opportunity

With recent changes in the criminal landscape, the coca market in Colombia has shifted. 

Since the second half of 2022, farmers in departments that produce most of the country’s coca crops, such as Norte de Santander, Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo, experienced a drop in coca leaf and coca paste prices of 45% and 30%, respectively.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Coca Market Crash Unlikely to Impact Cocaine Trade

There are several factors that influence changes in coca prices, such as a rise in the cost of raw material and the saturation of drug trafficking routes, or shifts in criminal control. One such change followed the FARC’s post-peace agreement exit from the territories in 2017.

Previously, the FARC dominated the coca market in the areas where they exercised territorial control. Since the FARC disarmed, other criminal groups have failed to establish the same level of control. Territorial disputes between groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) and FARC dissidents have exacerbated the drop in coca prices, as international buyers are reluctant to visit these contested areas.

As a result of the collapse in coca prices, more coca growers are willing to consider substitute crops. In parts of the department of Cauca, farmers have even turned to coffee as a solution. This is a window of opportunity that has not yet been taken advantage of by the government.

An Uncertain Future

Colombia’s current drug policy represents a different approach in the fight against drug trafficking in the country: instead of attacking small growers, it targets international cocaine trafficking networks.

SEE ALSO: The Opportunities and Pitfalls of Colombia’s Ambitious New Drug Policy

However, the policy has distanced itself from its initial substitution approach, arguing that these programs are limited, as they focus on short-term agreements and overlook structural aspects that are key to understanding and addressing the dependence of certain territories on illicit economies.

In response, debate has arisen around how coca production could be channeled toward legal uses for the coca leaf as an alternative to substitution. This has become one of the Petro government’s main policy priorities regarding coca cultivation.  

At the end of 2023, the Colombian Agricultural Institute (Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario – ICA) approved the first license for organic fertilizer made from coca leaf, grown in the departments of Cauca and Huila. In addition, Indigenous, peasant, and Afro-Colombian organizations have used coca leaf in the production of food and beverages, fabric dyes, and fertilizers. 

The creation of alternative economies is an important opportunity. A member of an international agency — who spoke to InSight Crime on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to comment on the issue — said that beyond substituting one crop for another, strategies can also focus on replacing illegal economies with legal ones, which can also help boost economic opportunities beyond agriculture. 

However, they pointed out that, if the state fails to replace one economy with another, the vacuum will continue to be filled by criminal groups and illegal economies. This is already happening in some coca-growing territories where, faced with falling coca prices, growers have migrated to illegal mining, an illicit economy that is making millions in profits for criminal groups. 

Featured image: Farmers carry loads of coca leaves harvested in Colombia. Credit: AP

The post State Inertia and Organized Crime Limit Colombia’s Coca Substitution Program appeared first on InSight Crime.

The war for control of the drug trade in Rosario, Argentina, has transformed the city into a hub for violence and is rooted in pacts between gangs, politicians, and police, according to a new book.

Rosario, Argentina’s third-largest city, recorded 259 homicides in 2023, or 22 per 100,000 inhabitants. This is five times the national average, according to figures from the Public Safety Observatory (Observatorio de Seguridad Pública), part of Santa Fe’s Ministry of Security, cited by La Nación.

The wave of violence began in 2013, but Rosario has long been an enclave for Argentina’s illicit industries. For decades, cocaine and other drugs have arrived in the city from the north of the country, or been shipped along the Paraná River to the Port of Rosario, before being sent to Europe or Africa.

SEE ALSO: New Strategies in Rosario, Argentina, as Monos Fight

Illicit drugs also stay in the city, flooding the local market and helping family drug clans consolidate their operations. Coupled with endemic corruption, the drug trade has turned Rosario into a war zone. 

InSight Crime spoke with Germán de Los Santos, co-author of “Rosario: The Story Behind the Narco Mafia That Took Over the City.” The recently published book seeks to explain the evolution of organized crime in Rosario and detail links between elites and criminal gangs.

InSight Crime (IC): Violence is not good for criminal groups seeking stability, so why do homicides in Rosario continue to rise?

Germán de los Santos (GdlS): There are no episodes of violence around large cocaine shipments because that would make them visible. Rather, violence revolves around street-level drug dealing because territorial control is essential to selling drugs. These [local] groups do not have an impact on the much larger business of transnational cocaine trafficking. In Rosario, the “managers” of this business are international groups, not the locals.

IC: So international drug trafficking and local drug dealing are separate?

GdlS: They appear to be parallel universes. Local drug peddling has driven the escalation of violence in Rosario for the last ten years. But there’s also cocaine trafficking to ports in Europe, Africa, Asia, and so on. So far, those two universes have not overlapped. I think the greatest risk in Rosario is the possibility that local gangs might someday decide to permeate the international business.

IC: The book recounts cinematic moments in Rosario’s criminal history, including the failed helicopter prison break by notorious drug trafficker, Esteban Alvarado. It also includes references to “The Godfather” and “Scarface.” How much does Hollywood influence real-life organized crime in Argentina?

GdlS: I think it has a certain impact. Often, criminals make plans based on ideals that emerge from fiction. Crime in Argentina has plenty of cinematic elements, but it is also very real. The helicopter escape failed because the pilot betrayed his boss. You can also hear how movies influence dialogue [between criminals]. When Alvarado said “I am a bank, don’t worry about the money”… it sounded like something from a movie, but it’s totally real. 

IC: Even the most powerful groups in Argentina are weaker than their counterparts in neighboring countries. Why have Rosario’s clans failed to expand beyond the city?

GdlS: It’s because they’re very fragmented. Today, the Monos are divided into five groups. Over time, they have failed to create a strong clan, instead splitting into sub-gangs that share the same name but have no central power. Their business is financially precarious. They lack a strategy for forming a gang with presence in different provinces. It would complicate things for them. 

SEE ALSO: Why Are Murders Spreading Across Argentina’s Most Violent City?

IC: Do you think integration between criminal and legal markets is influencing Rosario’s economy. Would the economy collapse if drug trafficking suddenly ceased?  

GdlS: One criminal economy in particular has grown considerably in the last five years: extortion. This business operates via a more traditional mafia model, but it is controlled by gangs that dominate drug dealing in Rosario. 

Extortion has increased because it generates significant income at a very low risk. Unlike drug dealing, which requires greater logistics to purchase and distribute narcotics, extortion groups can recruit youths with motorcycles and guns to patrol the area and collect money. The rise of extortion has spawned a VIP security business with armored cars. Situations previously unthinkable in Argentina are now becoming reality.

Today, Argentina’s informal economy runs parallel to the formal one. Illegal dollars drive the economy, allowing criminal groups to generate massive revenues by channelling money through informal financial spaces that later penetrate formal businesses like real estate.

IC: Do you think the new government’s plans to change the prison system will have any impact?

GdlS: [When the changes began to be implemented], there was a regrouping of high-profile prisoners from the Monos and other smaller gangs. They first responded with attacks in which they made threats against Rosario’s governor. The strategy at the national and provincial levels will be to create specific areas within jails for prisoners from the major gangs. But, so far, policies aimed at improving prison security have not been maintained. Besides, there is a great deal of corruption within federal and provincial prisons, and that’s where the government will have to take concrete actions. If not, the situation could get worse, considering the prisons are seriously overpopulated.

IC: What alternatives are left for Rosario?

GdlS: The new government of President Javier Milei announced the use of the armed forces to fight drug trafficking in Rosario. This has not happened since the return of democracy in 1983. Other countries have used the armed forces to fight drug trafficking, and it did not work well.

Today, the main problem in Rosario is that the leaders of criminal groups have consolidated in prison. The leaders are very difficult to control with adequate policies in place. It’s not only about security, but also social policies. Rosario has very high levels of poverty, and these groups penetrate poor spaces to recruit young people who end up as hired assassins.

*This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Feature image: The front cover of the book, “Rosario: The Story Behind the Narco Mafia That Took Over the City.” Source: Penguin Libros

The post How Rosario Became Argentina’s Drug Violence Capital appeared first on InSight Crime.

Yefer Gamboa is the mayor of Nuquí, a city on Colombia’s Pacific coast whose beaches and tropical rainforest attract thousands of tourists each year. But, in addition to being a touristic paradise, Nuqui’s jungle is also a refuge for armed groups that occupy the area, controlling and profiting from criminal activities.

Even before being elected in 2019, Gamboa encountered Nuqui’s dark side. The most powerful of the area’s criminal groups, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), offered to support him in the elections.

Gamboa refused their help. When he continued to reject the AGC’s advances, the threats began.

“They said the AGC was going to come in through my patio and kill or kidnap me,” Gamboa told InSight Crime.

Things got so bad that now, after four years, Gamboa is finishing his term as mayor from another city due to the threats.

His situation is not an isolated case in the department of Chocó, where the AGC has consolidated its control through violence.

In the lead-up to regional elections, which will take place on October 29, criminal groups have tried to influence voters. And one week before Colombians head to the polls, at least nine mayors in Chocó have been threatened or attacked by armed groups in the region.

The national government has recognized the crisis in the department. When President Gustavo Petro was elected in 2022, he promised to prioritize Chocó in his “Total Peace” plan, which aims to demobilize Colombia’s illegal armed groups. But negotiations with the AGC have deteriorated. And despite high expectations for Total Peace in the department, the future of Nuquí looks bleak.   

Establishing Control 

After years of working in the private sector as a civil engineer, Gamboa decided to run for mayor of Nuquí, promising to fight the corruption that for years had hindered the city’s development.

“We won the elections by a very small margin. We won by 51 votes, but we won!” Gamboa said. “We put together a campaign — with mostly young people — and we promised change.”

But even before becoming mayor, the shadow of the AGC hung over Gamboa.

Since 2016, the AGC has been in Nuquí, which, with its access to many rivers that connect the coast to inland Chocó and the rest of the country, is strategically located for transporting drugs to North America and Europe.

Gamboa’s first run-in with the group took place during the campaign. During a visit to a rural area outside Nuquí, he was approached by one of the AGC’s alleged leaders known by the alias “Jonas.” The AGC had heard that Gamboa had a good chance of winning, so Jonas, who is in charge of the AGC’s ideology and relations with local communities, offered to help him campaign.

But Gamboa refused the offer. “I said, ‘Look, the only thing that I ask is that you let us tell people what we are proposing and that you leave our boats alone, that you let us do our job like the rest of the candidates.’”

After the encounter, the AGC did not contact Gamboa again, and when he won the election, he thought that was the end of things.

SEE ALSO: Colombian Mayors at a Crossroads: Co-Govern With Criminals or Flee

At that point, the AGC had been slowly consolidating its power in Nuquí and other parts of Chocó for three years. Paramilitary groups under the umbrella of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) have been in the region since the 1990s when they came to fight the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). But it was not until 2016 that the AGC began to expand rapidly.

When the FARC disarmed and left the area after signing a peace deal with the Colombian government in 2016, the AGC and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) guerrilla group began a war over the FARC’s former territories that continues today.

In an “Early Alert” (Alerta Temprana) statement in 2022, the Ombudsman’s office said, “Following the turf war between [the ELN and AGC], it was the AGC who achieved an illegal and hegemonic control over the municipality of Nuquí and the rural areas around Bahia Solano.”

In the wake of the AGC’s victory, the group expanded its drug trafficking activities. According to Gamboa, they charge drug traffickers a fee to use the routes that go through Nuquí, which they also use for their own shipments. But the AGC did not stop there. The group extended their control not just over the territory and illegal economies, but also over local communities.

A Pervasive Presence 

By 2020, Gamboa had noticed a change in the area: the AGC now exercised strong social control over rural communities. Nothing happened in Nuquí without their knowledge.

Gamboa met with alias “Barbas,” the AGC’s new political leader in the Pacific region. Barbas was blunt, demanding support from the mayor’s office in the form of 900 million pesos (around $240,000).

The mayor flatly refused.

Barbas tried to negotiate, asking for 700 million (US$187,000), then 500 million pesos (US$133,000). In the end, Gamboa said, the AGC leader said their bare minimum request was seven boat motors.

But Gamboa would not budge. “Giving resources to illegal groups makes them stronger, and with those state resources, they buy weapons, extort people, and steal people’s boats. I don’t agree with that,” he said.

The AGC told the mayor that they were going to make their own inquiries to verify what he said about the lack of resources in the municipal budget. But first, they threatened him.

“Barbas told me, ‘We are going to look into the city budget, and if you have money, you have to give it to us. If not, we will take action,'” Gamboa said.

Two weeks after the encounter in Arusi, the AGC sent Gamboa a message saying he had to pay them 1 billion pesos (US$270,000) from the municipal budget.

In October 2020, confident in its territorial control, the group dared to assassinate the well-known environmental leader, Juana Perea. The media coverage, coupled with the government’s response — a joint operation between the police, the navy, and the Attorney General’s Office — forced the AGC to keep a low profile for a few months.

During that time, the AGC’s pressure on the mayor’s office eased. But Gamboa knew the calm in Nuquí would not last long.

Expanding Into Extortion

Once the authorities turned their attention elsewhere, the AGC returned to the territory in force — a scene that has taken place throughout Colombia. But, Gamboa said, the pressure from the authorities had affected the AGC’s main source of income, drug trafficking. So the group turned to Nuquí’s businesses, extorting tourism companies and gas stations.

“All the gasoline sellers had to raise the price of gasoline by 1,000 pesos to give it to these men,” said Gamboa.

The group also began to extort contractors working for the mayor’s office on various public works: remodeling the municipality’s airport, paving streets, and building community soccer fields.

According to Gamboa, the AGC demanded 6% of the value of the contract from each of the contractors in exchange for allowing them to continue with the projects.

“They called the contractors and said they were going to stop the project if they didn’t receive 6%. Of course, the engineers are not from Nuquí, they have no protection from anyone, so they stopped all the work,” the mayor said.

At the same time, the AGC began threatening Gamboa again. The group asked him for money and pressured him to meet with them.

But remote communities suffer the most.

“Since the end of 2021, the AGC has been a continuous presence in the Indigenous communities of Villa Nueva, Jagua, Puerto Indio, La Loma, Chorrito, and Yucal in the municipality of Nuquí, demanding that inhabitants sell their crops to the organization,” reads a 2022 report from the Ombudsman’s Office.

These rural areas also experience more violence because the ELN makes occasional incursions into the municipality, prompting an armed response from the AGC.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s ‘Total Peace’ 1 Year On: Less State Violence, Stronger Criminal Groups

Influencing Elections

The outlook in Nuquí, and in Chocó in general, is not encouraging. As the local government struggles and officials flee the area, the AGC grows stronger, solidifying their control.

Since 2022, the situation for Gamboa and the communities of the municipality has been untenable. “Things got worse this past year, because [before] people saw them as distant, busy with their drug trafficking. But now they are messing with the people, now they are stealing people’s boats. Now they are coming to the mayor’s office,” Gamboa said.

By August 2023, the pressure was so high and the danger so imminent that Gamboa decided to leave the municipality. He has been interviewed in national media and continues to denounce his situation. But even with all this media attention, it is not safe for him to return to the territory. In a municipality like Nuquí, neither the army nor the police are sufficient to protect him from the AGC.

Although Gamboa’s term as mayor is almost over, it still may not be safe for him to return, he told InSight Crime. And the current mayoral candidates are facing the same security challenges.

Ahead of the local elections, there have been reports of the AGC rallying communities to influence which candidates win.

“They are participating in politics and they are telling people not to vote for this one and to vote for this one,” Gamboa said.

The election results will determine the future of Nuquí. If the AGC manages to influence the vote through threats and pressure, their control will grow. And if a candidate not aligned with the group’s interests wins, they will face the same threats and pressures as Gamboa.

Towns throughout the department are facing the same issue.

The mayors of the municipalities of Rio Iró, San José del Palmar, Sipí, and Bagadó have been threatened by the AGC and the ELN. The mayors of Atrato, El Cantón del San Pablo, Unión Panamericana, Medio Baudó, and Lloró have been victims of attacks in the last year.

As elections approach, the Total Peace plan’s promise of disrupting the control of armed groups in Chocó seems increasingly distant.

The post Colombian Mayor Explains How Gaitanistas Took Over Key Drug Trade Town appeared first on InSight Crime.

On the morning of June 4, 2023, during a town celebration in La Playa de Belén in northwestern Colombia, armed men burst into the main square looking for the mayor, Ider Álvarez. Minutes earlier, gunfire on the way out of town had distracted police and military in the area. The mayor and a group of people who had taken refuge in the mayor’s office were trapped. 

Álvarez and his family were in La Playa de Belén for the celebration, but they had been living in another municipality for almost a year. Criminal groups had been threatening Álvarez, forcing him from his hometown in the sub-region known as Catatumbo, which is a hub for coca cultivation and processing with easy access to Venezuela.  

While his family managed to escape in an ambulance in the afternoon, Álvarez remained in hiding because his security forces said that there were snipers in the village. 

Scenes like this are common throughout the country. In October, Colombia will hold local and regional elections. Anticipating this change of power, criminal groups are attempting to influence the results in order to maintain or consolidate their territorial control.  

SEE ALSO: Peace Leaders in Putumayo, Colombia Bet Their Lives on Coca Crop Substitution

“Since March, there have been massive meetings with leaders by illegal organizations telling them who they should and should not vote for, which parties can and cannot enter the area,” the association that represents Colombia’s municipalities said in a recent statement. 

At least 12 mayors in seven of the country’s departments have been forced to govern outside their territories due to threats from armed groups, according to the Ombudsman’s Office.

Ider Álvarez was one of these 12 mayors. And his situation would soon become even more complicated.

Governing Under Threat

Álvarez grew up in La Playa de Belén, a small municipality in the department of Norte de Santander. After leaving the area in search of other opportunities in his youth, he returned in 2016 to work as a radio broadcaster. By 2019, he was one of the candidates for mayor. 

La Playa de Belén is a transit municipality that connects Sardinata, San Calixto, and Teorama — three of the municipalities with the highest rates of coca cultivation in Catatumbo — with the south of the department.  

Several armed groups have operated in the area for decades, including the guerrillas of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). 

The FARC, Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, signed a peace agreement in 2016 with the Colombian government. The demobilization of the FARC left a huge power vacuum in the country’s criminal landscape. In addition, several factions that did not want to disarm defected from the process over control of criminal economies and territories. 

In the end, three armed groups remained: those who did not demobilize, known as the ex-FARC mafia; the ELN; and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL), also known as Los Pelusos. 

Between 2018 and 2020, La Playa de Belén was the scene of a dispute between the ELN and the EPL. Shortly after announcing his candidacy in 2019, Álvarez began receiving threatening messages from alleged EPL members demanding money.

“First, to let me campaign, they asked me for 50 million pesos ($15,000), and [if I won], another 50 million per year,” he told InSight Crime. 

Álvarez was holding a campaign event in a rural area called Mesa Rica a month before the elections when men with long guns approached him. They identified themselves as members of Frente 33, one of the ex-FARC mafia, and told him that because his party was not affiliated with the dissident group, he was not allowed on their turf.

“They told me that these were orders, that I had to leave the area,” Álvarez said.

In spite of these threats, Álvarez did not give in, instead repeating his pledge for a transparent administration and refusing to pay the demanded sums throughout the rest of his campaign. In October 2019, he won the mayoral race.

But the criminal groups did not give up either. Álvarez heard from residents that armed groups threatened they would not “let him finish” his term. 

Years later, he would recall that slogan with a certain bitterness. 

By the time he took office, Catatumbo was immersed in a humanitarian crisis. Clashes between armed groups in January 2020 left at least 20,000 people confined to their homes for 17 days, according to figures from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

When the COVID-19 pandemic paralyzed Colombia and the entire world a few months later, both the ELN and the ex-FARC mafia imposed curfews and set up roadblocks at the entrances to villages. 

Once again, the ex-FARC mafia intercepted Álvarez during a visit to the rural area of the municipality. The armed men identified themselves and held him for several hours. Finally, they decided to release him, with the demand that Álvarez give them money from the town budget for medicines, food, cars, and even infrastructure projects.

Álvarez was not the only public official being targeted by armed groups. Due to the pandemic, both the ELN and the dissidents, as well as other groups in the area, increased their extortion schemes, especially targeting departmental and municipal government contractors in charge of public works projects. 

It was part of a wave of extortion at the national level. Sometimes they asked for a slice of the budget, and if they did not receive the money, they hindered the projects. The same armed groups also infiltrated local administrations in different parts of the country, diverting resources for their own benefit.

However, Álvarez refused to comply with these requests. The groups then began a smear campaign against him among La Playa de Belén’s inhabitants. Both the ex-FARC mafia and the ELN questioned his abilities, branded him as a state informant, and said he was reneging on his promises. Taking advantage of their influence in rural areas, where they can move freely and have greater social control over the population, both groups sent a strong and clear message: Ider Álvarez is our enemy. 

Mayor in Exile

In early 2022, the threats Álvarez had been receiving finally came to fruition. By that time he was no longer living in La Playa de Belén. He and his family had moved to the nearby town of Ocaña, and every day he traveled in an armored van with a government-assigned escort.

Álvarez met in mid-March 2022 with another local mayor who gave him a warning: The 33rd Front of the ex-FARC mafia had declared two mayors of Catatumbo a military target, and Álvarez was one of them.  

According to Álvarez’s colleague, the dissidents had said, “We have to kill that little guy because he is making fun of us. And the best way to teach the other mayors a lesson is by declaring him a target and assassinating him.” 

A week later, Álvarez arrived at the municipal palace to work. He had a meeting scheduled that afternoon in the nearby municipality of Abrego, so at around 2:40 p.m., he set out on the road. 

As he left the urban area, Álvarez noticed a suspicious person with a cell phone near him. This worried him, but he continued on his way. A few miles later, in a winding section of the road, he noticed three people up ahead standing with their backs to the street — an unusual sight. 

Coming out of the last curve, the van was attacked.

“The person who was in the middle bent down and picked up a rifle from the ground and started shooting. And the other two, one with a Mini-Uzi and another with a pistol, started shooting first at the engine, then at the driver’s seat,” Álvarez said. “It happened in just a few seconds.”

Álvarez got into a fetal position in the back seat. He called the police and the army, but when he realized that no one could reach them in time, he gave the order to drive on and try to get out of firing range. With three flat tires and the driver wounded, they made it to the army battalion a few miles away.

After the attack, Álvarez decided to leave the area completely and continue his work as mayor from Cúcuta, the department capital eight hours from La Playa de Belén. Other mayors in the region — among them the mayor of Tibú, Nelson Leal — and throughout Colombia have also had to leave their territories, governing from the capital of their departments. 

Álvarez’s family moved with him. A few months later, the situation seemed calmer, and Álvarez and his family moved back to Ocaña, accompanied by a few bodyguards.

But the danger was not over.

‘The Pressure Is Extremely Strong’

About a year later, after being trapped for hours, Álvarez finally escaped the mayor’s office at around 10 p.m. Escorted by two army tanks, he left La Playa de Belén and traveled back to Ocaña where his family was waiting. 

Once he knew that his family was safe and sound, Álvarez made a decision: Ocaña, 45 minutes from La Playa de Belén, was just too close for comfort. The more distance between Álvarez and the armed groups, the better. After moving his family to Cúcuta, this time for good, Álvarez denounced the attack on the Ombudsman’s Office and the police. 

At a security council meeting a few days later, Defense Ministry officials insisted that Álvarez should return to La Playa de Belén to finish his term, Álvarez said. 

The officials promised to increase his protection by providing more security forces. But entering a municipality in Catatumbo with increased security was not an option for Álvarez.

“That’s just daring the criminal groups,” he explained. 

SEE ALSO: Femicides in Tibú, Colombia: Cocaine, Gunmen, and a Never-Ending War

Faced with an impossible situation, Álvarez decided to resign. The governor’s office of the department of Norte de Santander accepted his letter of resignation on July 31. A few days later, trying not to attract attention, Álvarez left the country with his family. 

Despite the 2016 peace accord between the FARC and the Colombian government, political violence has been on the rise since 2017, reaching peaks in election years, according to figures from the Colombian Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electoral – MOE). In 2022, for example, 418 acts of violence against political leaders were recorded in the seven months prior to the presidential and legislative elections, compared with 202 acts of violence recorded in the same period for the 2018 presidential and legislative elections. 

In the run-up to local elections in Norte de Santander, a candidate for the council of Tibú, two leaders of Communal Action Committees (Juntas de Acción Comunal – JAC), and at least four social leaders have been assassinated so far this year. While judicial authorities have not declared who is responsible for the murders, the violent actions by armed groups in the area have risen in recent months. 

While doing fieldwork in the area in April 2023, InSight Crime confirmed that criminal groups are regularly imposing restrictions on the mobility of residents in Catatumbo, compared to field observations in 2020 and 2021. Despite developing peace talks with the government, armed groups’ control over the communities appears to be growing throughout the country. 

Members of the international community and social leaders, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation, agreed that ELN and ex-FARC mafia are increasingly active, threatening social and political leaders, imposing restrictions that confine citizens to their homes, mounting accusations and “war trials” against people in the community, and attacking humanitarian missions. 

Compared to the 2019 election period, there has been a 37.7% increase in political violence across the country, according to a report by the MOE. “There is a lot of pressure,” Álvarez told us from his hotel room in another country, referring not only to his situation, but also to the upcoming elections. For the moment, the Norte de Santander governor’s office has delegated an interim mayor to replace Álvarez. But in both La Playa de Belén and in the rest of Catatumbo, the violence and threats against candidates and civilians continue.

The post Colombian Mayors at a Crossroads: Co-Govern With Criminals or Flee appeared first on InSight Crime.

The prison sentence handed down in early December to the leader of the Castedo Clan, one of Argentina’s major cocaine trafficking organizations, has confirmed the group’s extensive connections to authorities and how they came to dominate the drug trade with Bolivia.

Delfín Reinaldo Castedo was sentenced to 16 years on charges of leading an illegal group dedicated to drug trafficking and money laundering, according to a December 7 press release from the Attorney General’s Office of Argentina. 

The year-long trial took place in the Salta province, northwestern Argentina, where Castedo and his family clan oversaw their trafficking activities. For 17 years, between 1999 and July 2016, Castedo directed the clan in Salta, which shares a border with Bolivia, and transported around four tons of cocaine from Bolivia toward Europe, by way of the Argentine cities of Rosario and Buenos Aires, each month, according to a report by Argentine media outlet La Nación.

In addition to his sentence, courts seized Castedo’s 19,954-hectare farm, “El Aybal,” located on the border with Bolivia in Salta province.

SEE ALSO: Argentina’s Castedo Clan Continues to Survive Despite Top Arrests

Six others received sentences ranging from three to nine years in prison for illegal activities tied to the Castedo Clan, including Castedo’s ex-wife Melba del Carmen Araujo, and his brother Raul Castedo, who the courts considered to be in charge of procuring cocaine in the Bolivian city of Santa Cruz.

Prosecutor Carlos Amad told the court that under Castedo’s leadership, the Castedo Clan had been one of the few Argentine criminal groups that had the capacity to traffic tons of cocaine from Bolivia to Europe, transiting through Argentina.

In 2015, Castedo himself was tied to even larger operators, including Carlos Salvatore, the lawyer and central figure in the 2015 Carbón Blanco (White Charcoal) trial, one of Argentina’s largest-ever drug trafficking cases.

InSight Crime Analysis

The conviction of Castedo has revealed the extent of his family clan’s connections with corrupt state representatives around Salta. But its leader’s downfall has done little to dent overall drug trafficking in Argentina.

The Castedo Clan’s network of corruption in Salta included the security forces and actors in the provincial and federal justice system. Judges like Raul Reynoso informed Castedo of each wire-tapping order against him, while late former congressman Ernesto Aparicio owned a farm that backed onto Bolivian farmland owned by Castedo’s sister that was used by the clan to move drugs, the Attorney General’s Office said. This use of land, including El Aybal farm, was central to the Castedo Clan’s strategic dominance on the border between Salta and Bolivia, official reports noted, providing them with the ability to move large quantities of cocaine from Bolivia into Argentina with near total impunity.

SEE ALSO: Salta, Argentina Profile

The border between Bolivia and Salta has been one of the most important entry points for cocaine produced in Santa Cruz de La Sierra into Argentina. From Salta, the drug travels along Route 34 to port cities such as Rosario — long the hub of cocaine trafficking out of Argentina — and the capital, Buenos Aires, before being transported to Europe.

Despite Castedo’s conviction, Argentina’s wider drug trafficking problems will not relent, the Argentine prosecutor in the case, Carlos Amad, told InSight Crime. Though reduced, drug seizures and investigations into the criminal groups that move drugs continue, he said. In 2019, InSight Crime reported that the Castedo Clan continued operating. But the clan’s power has diminished over time, Amad confirmed.

No other unified organization of the level of power of the Castedo Clan has emerged around Salta province. However, small criminal groups have established drug transport routes along the border and towards Rosario. The route along the Paraná River waterway has boomed as surveillance around Salta by authorities has increased. Meanwhile, cocaine shipments out of Rosario have continued apace. In August 2022, some 1,600 kilos of cocaine were seized in the city, allegedly on the way to Dubai. A year previous Rosario played an integral role in the shipment of Europe’s then-largest ever cocaine haul, when 23 tons were seized.

The post How Did the Castedo Clan Run the Drug Trade in Northern Argentina? appeared first on InSight Crime.

Argentina continues to struggle with a human trafficking crisis as domestic and international criminal networks use a range of legal businesses to hide their activities and elude authorities.

In a recent case, Argentine authorities dismantled an international human trafficking network in early September, arresting three people accused of trafficking women to Turkey for the purpose of sexual exploitation, according to a government press release.

The three individuals were the manager and directors of a dance company that they had been using as a front for their trafficking operations. The organization offered young women airline tickets, accommodation, food, and a salary of around $700 per month to perform shows at a pub in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, reported newspaper Clarin.

After performing shows for six days a week, the women were required to spend time with clients, for which they would be paid extra. 

“The real purpose, however, was to force them into prostitution,” Argentina’s Attorney General’s Office stated.

SEE ALSO: Coverage of Human Trafficking

Investigations showed that women were allegedly sent from Argentina to Ankara from 2021 onwards. One earlier victim complained to the Attorney General’s Office last July.

InSight Crime Analysis

This case is but the latest involving legitimate businesses masking activities connected to human trafficking, worsening fears that this criminal economy is thriving in Argentina.

In August, a large trafficking ring, allegedly involving 20 people and using a similar modus operandi, was broken up. A reported religious sect, known as Villa Crespo, used a yoga school in Buenos Aires, to lure women into “a situation of servitude and / or sexual exploitation,” according to a report from the Attorney General’s Office. Those arrested have been charged with money laundering, illicit association, and human trafficking after also allegedly laundering millions of dollars in Argentina and the United States.

SEE ALSO: Coverage on Gender and Crime

Other cases have involved domestic human trafficking. Earlier in September authorities in the Argentine city of Concordia arrested four members of a religious organization who allegedly trafficked people for labor exploitation. And in December last year, two people were arrested in the western city of Salta on charges of human trafficking and sexual exploitation.

These events are consistent with the US Trafficking in Persons Report 2022, which stated that “Argentine adults and children are sexually and labor exploited in other countries.” 

In 2010, the UN had urged Argentina to improve its anti-trafficking processes, expressing concerns “that coordination of anti-trafficking activities between the national and provincial levels is weak,” and that the trafficking of children for labor and sexual exploitation was a particular worry. 

Argentina has taken steps to address these risks. The US State Department now considers Argentina a Tier 1 country, meaning that it “fully meets the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking” and complies with a wide range of requirements. However, “official complicity remained a concern,” said the report, and criticized the country for not providing a dedicated budget for anti-trafficking measures. 

The post Legitimate Businesses Used as Fronts for Human Trafficking in Argentina appeared first on InSight Crime.

A series of videos showing ex-FARC dissidents patrolling the streets of a Colombian town close to the Venezuelan border show how the group has taken advantage of a weakening state presence in a region coveted by criminal actors.

Videos circulated on social media between July 14 and 16 showed armed members of a branch of the ex-FARC Mafia, known as the 33rd Front, carrying heavy weapons and wandering the streets of Tibú, a municipality in the northeastern Norte de Santander department – a crucial hub of coca cultivation.

In the videos, the masked dissidents can be seen questioning civilians and stopping vehicles as they move through the town’s streets.

One video showed the FARC dissidents in front of the mayor’s office in Tibú. The leader of the group addressed the local population, saying they were establishing a presence in the area to offer protection.

“Today we are in the center of Tibú, providing security to all the people…We are the special urban combat forces of the FARC-EP’s 33rd Front,” said one of the dissidents.

SEE ALSO: Coverage of Organized Crime in Colombia

Earlier in July, the same group of dissidents was filmed visiting bars and nightclubs in the town, telling civilians they were providing security in the area.

The presence of the ex-FARC Mafia in Tibú dates back to 2018, following the signing of a peace agreement between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the national government. The 33rd Front – one of the many ex-FARC factions not to obey the peace agreement – primarily operates in rural parts of the municipality, where it grows coca and processes cocaine in laboratories to finance its continuing conflict against the state.

The ex-FARC dissidents are not the only guerrilla group to have recently walked the streets of Tibú unchallenged. At the start of July, members of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) went to an urban area in the municipality to attend the burial of a member killed while fighting the Colombian army.

Other armed groups have also sought control of Tibú and the surrounding region, including the Urabeños and the People’s Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL).

InSight Crime Analysis

Though the videos posted on social media offer a glimpse into the FARC dissidents’ authority in Tibú, these daytime patrols are not the group’s only means of exerting social control.

Sources in Tibú told InSight Crime the ex-FARC patrols have been frequent since the end of 2021. But in recent months, there have also been several cases of 33rd Front dissidents punishing alleged thieves and drug dealers. Punishments have ranged from public humiliation to death.

SEE ALSO: Is Colombia’s Military Deployment Playing into FARC Dissidents’ Hands?

These forms of social control are not new to Tibú or its surroundings. Armed groups, including the now-demobilized FARC, have long sought to stamp their authority on communities in Norte de Santander, and have attempted to resolve disputes and maintain order.

These most recent examples may stem from an attempt by armed groups to improve their relationship with the local civilian population and avoid animosity.

These groups are growing both economically and militarily, exploiting criminal economies in Tibú and the wider region, such as drug routes to Venezuela and swaths of coca crops.

The post FARC Dissidents Patrol Streets in Broad Daylight on Colombia-Venezuela Border appeared first on InSight Crime.

Colombia has gone from a peaceful election in 2018 to a violent electoral process in 2022, with the increase in violence explained in part by the ongoing reconfiguration of criminal groups in the aftermath of the historic peace agreement.

Amid great anticipation, Colombia will either elect a new president on May 29 or choose the candidates who will go on to a second round of elections in June. According to the most recent report published by the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electoral – MOE), the 2022 presidential and legislative elections have so far been the most violent in the country in 12 years. The organization determined that, in comparison to 2018, there was a 109 percent increase in acts of violence in this pre-electoral period.

The actions of illegal armed actors have contributed to the deterioration of the security situation. At least one criminal group maintains a presence in 59 percent of the municipalities where election-related violence has occurred, according to El Tiempo.

SEE ALSO: Colombia News and Profile 

The Urabeños, the heirs of the country’s paramilitary groups, and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), are behind the violence in at least six of the country’s 32 departments. The three departments most affected are Cauca, Nariño and Chocó, according to the Ombudsman’s Office, all key territories for organized crime.

This panorama is completely opposite to that of the 2018 elections. In just four years, these groups have managed to grow economically and militarily following the signing of a peace agreement between the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the national government in 2016.

Colombia is going through “a context of reconfiguration of this conflict, characterized by the consolidation of multiple illegal armed groups, that have taken advantage of the vacuum left behind by the extinct FARC guerrillas and the inability of the state to occupy territories,” said Alejandra Barrios, director of the MOE.

A number of FARC dissident groups have further complicated the fragmentation of organized crime in the country, and the resurgence of violence. Ahead of one of the most important elections in Colombian history, some criminal groups have used their resources to influence the country’s future.

Below, InSight Crime analyzes the actions of Colombia’s main armed groups.

The ELN’s Cease-Fire

Although its participation in criminal economies such as drug trafficking and illegal mining has weakened the political discourse of Colombia’s last-standing guerrilla, the ELN is still interested in participating in the country’s political agenda.

For the May 29 elections, the group announced a unilateral ceasefire, which can be interpreted as a peace offering for the next government and a show of willingness to engage in dialogue. However, when analyzing the group’s actions, some contradictions arise.

First, ELN commander Eliécer Erlinto Chamorro Acosta, alias “Antonio García,” stated on his Twitter account that the guerrilla reserves the right to defend themselves if attacked. “The ball is in the new president’s court,” García added. 

Second, recent history has demonstrated that there are divergent positions within the ELN regarding possible peace talks. One reason that could explain the lack of interest in possible peace talks, according to La Silla Vacía, is the group’s growing economic and military strength.

Third, as indicated by the Ombudsman’s Office’s February 2022 alert, in territories where an illegal group has hegemonic control, intimidating messages are generated to influence the election or financially support candidates.

Finally, the guerrillas continues to engage in territorial disputes throughout the country. In Chocó, for example, the group is battling the Urabeños, and in Cauca, they have clashed with FARC dissident groups. The constant armed battles and attacks in these territories make it difficult for the ELN to talk about a real ceasefire.

The Urabeños’ Criminal Campaign

Unlike the ELN’s contradictory actions, the Urabeños have directly and actively participated in the 2022 elections.

The most recent demonstration was an armed strike that took place in May 2022. While this came following the extradition of the group’s leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” the Urabeños also took advantage of the opportunity to make its presence felt in the pre-election period.

Leonardo González, Projects Coordinator for the Institute for Development and Peace Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – INDEPAZ), found the group’s action to be “staging in the middle of an electoral dispute to strengthen the discourse of fear, and in this way, to try to influence the elections.”

Over the four-day armed strike, the Urabeños openly forbade campaigning for certain candidates and voting for them.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Election Year Begins with Alarming Escalation in Violence 

Additionally, “they are conducting meetings in rural settlements and villages and assure that they will be the ones who will impose security on election day,” a social leader in the Ovejas municipality of Sucre department told the news outlet La Marea. 

The Urabeños indicated what their actions would look like in the context of the presidential election during the lead up to the legislative elections held on March 13. In February, the group threatened 28 political leaders and their families in the city of Barrancabermeja, El Tiempo reported. The leaders were given 48 hours to leave the territory, or risk being killed.

The group also sowed terror in Montes de María, a subregion that consists of 15 municipalities in the departments of Sucre and Bolívar. Community members there reported targeted killings and electoral indoctrination meetings, El Tiempo reported.  

While the Urabeños’ actions could be interpreted as part of a political agenda, the armed group is focused on criminal incomes. The areas in which the paramilitaries have positioned themselves in the context of the elections coincide with key territories for drug trafficking and illegal mining.

The Ex-FARC Mafia’s Silence

Unlike the ELN and Urabeños, it appears the FARC dissidents are not as interested in influencing the presidential elections. Rather, they are focused on maintaining territorial control and profiting from drug trafficking.

During the FARC-era, influencing national politics was a priority. Today, the former strongholds of the extinct guerrilla group reflect a radical change, as dissident structures are now more focused on controlling illicit crops and drug trafficking routes.

In the department of Putumayo, for example, a local journalist told InSight Crime that “the dissidents are not influencing the vote. The conflict lies solely and exclusively in what the territory has to do with drug trafficking.”

This contrasts greatly with what was seen during the last local elections in 2019, in which different dissident factions threatened and assassinated candidates throughout the country. This suggests that the dissidents did at one point have an interest in retaining and controlling their local political allies, who are not only within their reach, but are also indispensable for conducting their criminal activities in the territories where they maintain a presence.

*Camila Montoya contributed to this article.

The post How Colombia’s Criminal Groups Are Preparing for Presidential Elections appeared first on InSight Crime.

Colombia’s electoral calendar is crowded, with legislative and two rounds of presidential elections scheduled over the next three months. But politicians are not the only ones jockeying for position as the country’s criminal groups are also trying to be heard. 

On March 5, police in Bogotá seized material to make explosives, with the capital’s police chief stating that this was likely related to threats made ahead of the electoral season by groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) or dissidents from the now-demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). Colombia’s largest criminal threat has certainly made headlines in the run-up to elections.

From February 23 to 26, the ELN carried out a paro armado (a coordinated series of violent actions) across Colombia, blocking off highways, setting off explosions and burning vehicles, as well as leaving their flags across much of the country. While this was likely intended as a show of strength ahead of the vote, the ELN has also declared that it will hold a ceasefire on March 13, the day of legislative elections.

More broadly, Colombia’s Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz y Reconciliación — PARES) has reported 163 victims of electoral violence since March 13, 2021. This translates to one government official, political candidate or pre-candidate, or political activist being killed, attacked or threatened every two days. To be sure, not all of these can be related to organized crime groups. But some are likely.

On February 23 and 24, three separate attacks were made on candidates from the Comunes party, created by former guerrillas after the demobilization of the FARC, leaving dead. The situation is so dire even the United Nations is concerned. In a statement on March 3, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said it was “preoccupied by the presence of armed criminal groups…and their negative impact on the security guarantees for the electoral process.” 

Below, InSight Crime looks at five regions of Colombia, each with specific criminal dynamics, which are the most likely to suffer in the run-up to elections:

SEE ALSO: Colombia News and Profile

Cauca

In Cauca, the situation is so precarious and alarming in the run up to the elections, that in some municipalities to the north of the department, such as Buenos Aires and Caldono, where the presence of the Jaime Martínez Mobile Column is reported, it is impossible to guarantee the safety of the candidates looking to campaign there.

In Buenos Aires, the Mayor’s Office restricted campaign spaces almost entirely, due to a lack of security guarantees for citizens and candidates. In its most recent risk map, the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electoral – MOE) notes the constant harassment of security forces and aggressions against social and community leaders, constitute a risk factor for civilians and candidates in the run-up to the election.

So far in 2022, there have been three massacres and five social leaders have been killed.

The likelihood of further violence manifesting itself ahead of the upcoming elections is high. The MOE has warned that 31 out of 42 municipalities in Cauca are at high risk of violence. Many of these, including Argelia, El Tambo, Caloto and Santander de Quilichao are among the most violent in Colombia, given the large-scale presence of armed groups.

Arauca

So far in 2022, Arauca has seen the highest levels of violence in Colombia. The department saw 61 homicides in January alone and, in February, Arauca suffered during a three-day paro armado (a coordinated series of violent events) by the ELN. The group attacked a police station in the Fortul municipality and ordered an important waterway between Colombia and Venezuela to be temporarily closed off.

These murders occurred amidst a dispute between the ELN’s Domingo Laín Sáenz Front and the FARC’s 10th and 28th dissident fronts. These fronts intend not only to wrest territory away from the ELN, but also to weaken the guerrilla’s longtime political and social influence in the region.

One of the ways to do this, is by threatening, intimidating or killing any leader or politician that demonstrates an affinity towards the ELN. On February 3, a social leader in the town of Tame, Hernán Naranjo Quintero, was murdered, and four other political candidates were threatened that same month. The threats have heightened fears among candidates who are not traveling to rural areas to campaign.

SEE ALSO: Ex-FARC Mafia vs. ELN: a Fight Too Far at Colombia-Venezuela Border?

This is on top of a serious humanitarian crisis in the department that could have dire consequences for the elections. There is a real fear among activists and candidates that they become increasingly vulnerable as the elections come closer, according to one expert. “Social, political and community leaders have been strongly discouraged from participating in politics because of the violence in the region,” Mauricio Vela, an election coordinator, told El Espectador. Likewise, locals fear they will be targeted if they try and exercise their right to vote.

Bajo Cauca, Antioquia

In mid-February, the Ombudsman’s Office issued a statement in regards to this sub-region of Antioquia, stating that the local dispute between armed groups is directly related to the elections. The Urabeños and Los Caparrapos are present in this strategic drug trafficking region, both with large mining operations.

Both groups exert strong social and political control over the civilian population and have recently focused their efforts on intimidating political candidates. At the beginning of January, Los Caparrapos threatened several leaders of the Mining Board of Segovia and Remedios (Asociación Mesa Minera Segovia y Remedios) for their mining activity and due to several of its members supporting candidates in the peace seats.

Politically, the region has been influenced by illegal armed groups. Of the six local governments elected in Bajo Cauca in 2020, two of them raise concerns about potential corruption and relationships with criminal groups, El Espectador reported.

Putumayo

FARC dissidents are putting pressure on political candidates and the civilian population in Putumayo. According to El Tiempo, several candidates for the House of Representatives notified the authorities of armed groups prohibiting them from campaigning and pressuring citizens to vote in a particular way.

There is also evidence that dissent and criminal gangs are exerting pressure on Puerto Asis, Orito and Valle del Guamuez to prevent the population from participating in the next election, and, if so, to vote for a certain candidate.

Faced with the reports, the commander of Putumayo’s police, Colonel Roberto Marín, declared that the presence of the dissident groups the 48^th Front and the Carolina Ramírez Front could primarily affect campaign activities on the border with Caquetá, i.e., the municipalities of Puerto Guzmán and Puerto Leguízamo.

Putumayo was under the influence of the FARC’s 48th Front, up until the Peace Accord was signed in 2016. However, since 2018, there has been a conflict between the two dissident groups of the former FARC. The 48th Front dissidence, allied with La Constru and with the Second Marquetalia, began a fight to the death against the Carolina Ramírez Front, an ally of Gentil Duarte.

Valle del Cauca

The violence also threatens electoral campaigns in Valle del Cauca. In mid-January, a businessman who was a member of a political movement reported being attacked by unknown persons after having participated in a public event. Likewise, a senator and congressional candidate also denounced vandalism against their political headquarters in Cali.

Instances of aggressions and threats are increasingly being denounced by candidates and political party members in the Valle del Cauca department, reports RCN Radio. In fact, between March 2021 and January 2022, Valle del Cauca saw the highest number of aggressions and acts of violence against candidates in Colombia, according to the MOE.

Additionally, in the rural area of Tuluá, in the center of the department, alleged dissidents of the Adán Izquierdo Column have raided and marked houses with insignia, politically proselytizing. It is still being investigated whether the armed men were actually part of the dissidence, but nevertheless, those behind these incidents are still seeking to influence the electoral processes in the coming months.

A variety of actors merge together in the Valle department, posing a risk to the population, candidates and the authenticity of the upcoming elections. The dissident Jaime Martínez and the Adán Izquierdo Column of the Western Coordinating Command are present there, as are the Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion – EPL) and the Rastrojos.

The post Colombia’s Election Year Begins with Alarming Escalation in Violence appeared first on InSight Crime.

A colossal seizure of more than 10,000 cannabis plants in the western provinces of Salta and Jujuy in Argentina provides evidence that marijuana growers are trying to spread the illicit crop to new parts of the country.

In early February, security forces conducted a multi-pronged operation in the provinces of Salta and Jujuy, where they seized 10,000 cannabis plants and seeds. The plants ranged from seedlings to 2,500 plants that were over two meters in height.

According to an Argentine National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional Argentina) news release, the plantation – located in a jungle area – reportedly looking like “a marijuana forest.” Two men were arrested and charged with planting and growing the marijuana but were not linked to a larger criminal group.

SEE ALSO: Salta, Argentina Profile

This was the largest ever single discovery of marijuana in Argentina and comes amid record-high seizures of drugs in the country. However, until now, the majority of drugs in the country came from Paraguay, a colossal marijuana producer.

Eduardo Villalba, the federal prosecutor in charge of this marijuana investigation told the newspaper, El Tribuno, that “this sounds the alarm that planting, sowing and cultivating has started in our country.”

InSight Crime Analysis

Although marijuana crops have been discovered in Argentina in the past, the size of this plantation and its location – far away from previous planting sites – may signal that the country is shifting toward becoming a large-scale producer.

Argentina has a well-deserved reputation as a heavy consumer of cocaine and marijuana. But until now, most of the marijuana distributed in large cities was sourced from Paraguay and smuggled through the border provinces of Misiones and Corrientes.

SEE ALSO: Argentina News and Profile

However, this may no longer be a safe way of doing business. Paraguay has led repeated operations against marijuana producers, and more scrutiny at the Triple Border Area (TBA) – where Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay meet – has seen a rise in drug seizures.

Traffickers may now be looking for alternatives. However, previous examples of experimental crops in Argentina have been much smaller and closer to the Triple Border Area.

This latest seizure was found in provinces that have a stronger association with cocaine trafficking because of its proximity to Bolivia.

Additionally, the method employed by the growers in Salta and Jujuy was very similar to that used by groups in Paraguay. They camouflaged their illicit crops amid larger tracts of land and under forest cover.

It remains to be seen whether marijuana crops will become a mainstay in Argentina. But while this seizure remains an outlier, it may lead to more such discoveries in remoter parts of the country.

The post Argentina Redraws Marijuana Maps After Massive Seizure appeared first on InSight Crime.

A criminal borrowed the surname of the imprisoned Monos gang boss to receive extortion payments from businesses in the Argentine city of Rosario – a play that smacks of a copycat or franchise operation.

Prosecutors allege that Gastón Ezequiel Escalante attempted to extort large sums of cash from businesses by posing as a Monos gang member named Pablo Cantero. Cantero is the surname of the fearsome clan’s boss, Ariel Máximo Cantero, alias “Guille.”

“I am the guy who is going around collecting in the area,” Escalante can be heard saying in a recording included in court documents accessed by news outlet El Litoral.

Authorities said that no Pablo Cantero exists in the group.

SEE ALSO: The Monos Profile

Escalante, who is in prison on gang-related charges, demanded up to 10,000 pesos per week (about $100) in protection money from business owners. Those who refused faced their establishments being riddled with bullets or torched by Molotov cocktails, a tactic used by the Monos in the past and one recently adopted by other criminal groups in Rosario to intimidate their enemies.

Two of Escalante’s associates collected the money, according to authorities. They were also charged in the case, which went before a judge in mid-November.

InSight Crime Analysis

Copycat extortion is a dangerous game played in other regions of Latin America home to violent gangs.

The tactic is particularly common in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, where deadly street gangs impose control through extortion.

Countless criminals have passed themselves off as members of the feared Barrio 18 and MS13 gangs in order to extort victims. Guatemalan officials claim that one in four extortion attempts are the work of copycats, while El Salvador police officials say impersonators could be behind more than half of all extortion attempts.

SEE ALSO: Copycat Extortionists: Guatemala’s Criminal Chancers

In Argentina, the Monos have dominated Rosario’s criminal landscape for more than two decades. Monos boss “Guille” Cantero has also shown a striking ability in recent years to continue to run the group’s operations from his prison cell.

Impersonating a gang leader to collect from businesses on the group’s behalf, though, is a far riskier tactic than the typical copycat. This raises the question of whether the Monos may be franchising: allowing other criminal gangs to use the Monos name for a cut of proceeds.

In Colombia, large criminal groups have been known to expand their influence this way. For example, the Urabeños have allowed gangs to use their name in certain territories to facilitate their drug trafficking or to take on rival groups.

The Monos may be making a similar move, which would provide them greater strength on the streets of Rosario while much of their leadership is in prison.

Whatever the case may be, the Cantero name clearly carries weight.

The post Extortionists Copycat Argentina’s Monos Gang appeared first on InSight Crime.